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The Takings Clause and Partial
Interests in Land
ON SHARP BOUNDARIES AND CONTINUOUS
DISTRIBUTIONS
Richard A. Epstein†
INTRODUCTION
The title of this conference—Post-Zoning: Alternative
Forms of Public Land Use Controls—is fitting for the David
Trager Symposium. David was a close friend of mine, and
during the years that he was dean, he brought me to New York
City and Brooklyn Law School to speak about the question of
rent control, which I attacked in my usual blunt fashion.1 The
question of land use regulation is to some extent orthogonal to
the rent control question—which deals with financial matters
rather than with physical externalities between adjacent, and
not so adjacent, landowners. I have no question that market
solutions work far more smoothly for financial relations
between landlord and tenant than they do for physical
interactions among strangers. There is no need for a law of
nuisance to regulate financial interactions among various
rights holders. But there is, decidedly, that need when dealing
with disputes between ordinary landowners. The law of
nuisance is the relevant body of law, and its development long
antedates the rise of Progressive legal theory.2
†

Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law;
the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; the James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and senior lecturer, The University
of Chicago. I should like to thank participants at the University of Chicago Work-inProgress Workshop of January 3, 2013 for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper, and Jordana Haviv, Benjamin Margo, and Joshua Stanton, NYU Law School,
class of 2014 for their valuable assistance on earlier drafts of this article.
1
Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to
Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1281 (1989).
2
See Joel Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 403 (1974).
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Put more generally, no one could possibly argue—and I
have not argued3—that all forms of liability and regulation
should have no role to play in land use disputes. But that
necessary concession to state power does leave open the
question of exactly which forms of regulation should be
imposed, and how. In dealing with this question, I take the
general approach that any system of weak property rights will
necessarily lead to political mischief. The definition of a weak
property right for these purposes is one whose validity depends
on the complex interaction of multiple variables, each of
uncertain weight. The adoption of this approach quickly drives
courts toward a view that the determination of rights depends
on the reasonableness of certain conduct under the
circumstances. In the absence of any strong theory of property
rights, courts tend to show extreme deference to the decisions
of legislatures and administrative agencies. The actions of
these groups, however, are vulnerable to political intrigue that
can shift certain key property rights—such as the right to
develop land—back and forth between individuals in an ad hoc
fashion. Some measure of stability is found in the takings
law—under the key decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.4—insofar as it adopts a rule of per se
compensation for cases of direct government occupation. But
the law of regulatory takings—those challenges dealing with
government regulation that restricts the power of property
owners to use, develop, or alienate their land—is governed by
the decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,5 which takes a self-conscious pride in insisting that only
“ad hoc” rules are capable of resolving challenges to government
regulation under the Takings Clause.6
The great vice in takings law lies in the abandonment of
principled adjudication in regulatory takings cases. The
argument here is that the correct set of bright-line rules will
reduce the level of discretion afforded to land use regulators,
such that the secure property rights created will lead to higher
levels of investment and, as a result, higher overall levels of

3

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Central to Lingle: The Long
Backwards Road, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593 (2007).
4
458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
5
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6
Id. at 123-24.
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social welfare.7 The recognition that property rights have, in
many instances, sharp boundaries imposes clear extrinsic
limitations on what it is that legislatures and administrative
agencies can do with respect to those rights. This argument is
not intended to say that there are no difficult takings cases.
The full system of takings requires the incorporation of two
further elements. The first deals with implicit in-kind
compensation and the second with the state’s exertion of the
police power. First, in ordinary takings cases, the compensation
supplied to a landowner is in cash. But there is in principle no
reason why that compensation could not be supplied in-kind.
That in-kind compensation is critical in understanding any
complex zoning scheme that simultaneously imposes both
benefits and burdens on all its members. In some cases, the
benefits from the scheme are compensation for the burdens
that it imposes on all its members. That outcome usually holds
when the gains and burdens are proportionate across all
players. In other cases, the skew between benefits and burdens
indicates that cash compensation may still be required to make
up for shifts in wealth between the parties. Second, the
traditional police power inquiry is whether the government
taking of property is justified under the police power as a
means to protect “the safety, health, morals, and general
welfare of the public [at large].”8 This formulation was applied,
controversially, in Lochner v. New York.9 In this article, I shall
not dwell on those cases because the issues that I address
involve categorical mistakes in analysis by the Supreme Court
that implicate neither of these central concerns to the overall
structure of the law.
What is relevant from the earlier work is the continued
insistence that it is only possible to develop a consistent view of
public law by following the sound articulation of private law
7

I have developed this theme in greater detail in Richard A. Epstein, The
Property Rights Decisions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: When Pragmatic Balancing
Is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 177 (2012).
8
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 3, at 107-45 (quoting Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9
See 198 U.S. at 53 (“There are, however, certain powers, existing in the
sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the
exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those
powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific
limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public. Both
property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the
governing power of the State in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions
the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere.”).
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principles. In this regard, a sound body of takings law should
follow the appropriate formula for a sound body of private law,
which, when properly formulated, relies on clear boundary
lines to determine who is entitled to do what.10 The decision to
offer compensation in takings cases, like the decision to offer
compensation in tort law, should be governed by bright-line
rules. By the same token, the amount of compensation awarded
for the taking should vary continuously with the amount of the
loss inflicted on the owner. In this regard, the public law differs
from the private law, insofar as governments are authorized to
make takings for public use, and thus need only compensate for
the owner’s loss and do not have to make restitution for the
public gain.
In short, to make takings law more principled and
predictable, a continuity between torts and takings is central to
the overall operation of the system. As will become evident,
however, that principle is widely rejected, most notably in the
Court’s flooding cases, which are an example of the incongruent
distinction between permanent and temporary takings.11 A
similar weakness infects the well-established constitutional
distinction between partial and total takings, where the
analysis often starts and ends with the question of whether the
regulation in question has gone “too far” to be done under the
police power.12 The proper approach to compensability does not
depend on these elusive notions of degree. Instead it should
follow the lead of the private law of conveyances, especially as
it is embodied in the law governing mineral support rights.
Whenever government action shifts private rights from one
party to another, a taking has occurred. All questions of degree
are reserved for determining the proper level of compensation.
In dealing with the regulatory issues of this conference,
these insights are lost in the push for ever more government
regulation in the land use area, all without compensation to
those property owners whose use rights are either restricted or
eliminated. More specifically, I am deeply troubled by the use
of the words “Post-Zoning” in the conference title. New York
City is on any account a place where public administrators
exercise huge discretion over what parties should be allowed to
develop what property on what terms. Yet the use of this
conference title moves us in exactly the wrong direction by
10
11
12

See infra Part I.B.
See infra pp. 600-07.
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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making it appear that the major defect in the current system of
land use regulation is that zoning law has proved inadequate to
grapple with all the complex issues of land use, so that additional
systems are needed in order to pick up the slack. My worst fears
are richly confirmed simply by looking at one slide from the
presentation of New York City Council Member Brad Lander,
from the 39th District, which neatly links a set of overambitious
goals with an expanded set of zoning and nonzoning tools
designed to implement them. Thus, the slide reads as follows:

It is hard to imagine a more relentlessly self-destructive
agenda for New York City. The first of its many ills is the effort
to link massive forms of labor regulation to real estate
development. These labor regulations all are intended to raise
wages above competitive levels for the benefit of the union
workers who are behind the program, resulting, for example, in
upending the Kingsbridge Armory project in 2009.13 The real
estate regulations—pay particular notice to “special permits”—
are a way to hold the developers hostage to the labor rules. The
combined effect is lower efficiency in both sectors, and an
13

For the most recent effort to jumpstart the project, see Eyewitness News,
City Reopens Proposals for Kingsbridge Armory Site, WABC-TV/DT (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local/new_york&id=8521255. The site
was abandoned in 1996 and is still undeveloped.
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enormous boon to the political influence of public officials like
Mr. Lander, who are able to insert themselves as of right into
the middle of every land use decision that takes place within
the city. One can recognize from the huge complexity in the
patterns of land use in New York City, where land uses can
vary within a single block, that zoning is often not the
appropriate way to sort things out. But it hardly follows that
another set of regulations should be brought into play to deal
with zoning’s supposed shortfall. Zoning laws seek to deal with
the conflicts that arise from the locational adjacencies that are
commonplace in any dense urban environment, which they
regulate only with indifferent success. In many cases the most
difficult issues that a sound system of public regulation must
deal with are such mundane issues as noise mitigation and
traffic congestion, but these occupy at most a small fraction of
attention on the Lander list.
The avidity with which land use regulators champion
multiple alternative land use controls should be understood as
part of the long-standing governance problem facing local
communities. Contrary to the hopes of planners, an increased
level of government regulation is not part of any sustainable
solution to land use issues. New kinds of regulatory schemes
are often merely layered on top of existing regulations.14 The
root of the difficulty here is that the current system of property
rights in land is so weak that virtually all land use regulation
issues are securely within the public domain. Rights to
possession may remain secure, which is good as far as it goes.
But it does not go far enough when state governments have
veto rights over any plan for use or development of current
land, which they can then tie to their collateral ambitions in
“wage standards,” or indeed a host of other issues. The
predictable outcome from this process is overall delay and
systematic favoritism that allows one lucky or well-placed
developer—it is never clear which—to receive the benefits not
only of approvals but also of the blocking position against rival
projects within the city. Ad hoc schemes of regulation are thus
treacherous because the very freedom that allows the rare
high-minded government official to put new schemes into place
offers the freedom for battalions of ambitious government

14

For a discussion of these possibilities, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming
Transect Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571 (2013) (describing novel zoning techniques that
overlap with traditional Euclidian zoning on matters of aesthetics and performance).
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officials to put misguided government regulations into place,
piece by piece.
In light of the manifest risks in the current
constitutional and political order, the central question lies not
in the details of any novel scheme. Rather, it lies in finding the
types of systematic institutional constraint so desperately
needed to channel the political discretion Council Member
Lander and his cohorts have carved out for themselves into
productive channels. On this point, the conventional wisdom
plays into the hands of the status quo because it rests on the
view that sound political judgment is needed to make the
system go, and that such judgment is possible only in a legal
regime that places sharp limitations on the reach of the
Takings Clause to the federal and state constitutions.15 More
specifically, the received wisdom today insists that while just
compensation may be required whenever the government
permanently occupies land, it ought never—except perhaps in
extreme cases of “no economic viability”16—be required to
compensate when it “merely” regulates land use, whether or
not as part of some comprehensive zoning scheme.
The argument in favor of the status quo—to the extent
that anyone even bothers to address these questions today—is
that the introduction of a compensation requirement will
necessarily impede the implementation of systematic planning
in the public good, which requires a high level of political
control over the process. Any desirable protections that are
afforded are thought to be procedural in nature, such that
individual landowners have the right to present their views at

15

For an early statement of this position, see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
33 (1954) (citations omitted):
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of
values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
16

For a statement of this position, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted): “As we
have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.”
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public hearings and through other forms of political action.17
Strong property entitlements thus give way to partial
participation rights in the overall political process.
All this is sadly misplaced. In my view, the ultimate
question in land use regulation does not deal with the
particulars of any given scheme of land use control. It deals
with the question of whether we should draw a line between
those areas that are subject to per se rights of compensation
and those in which no compensation is owing at all, which, as I
noted above, should be determined by clear rules and not ad
hoc balancing tests. The first of these domains of permanent
physical occupation is outlined in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,18 which follows a per se compensation
rule. The second of regulatory takings is most closely
associated in modern times with Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,19 which relies on a mushy balancing test.
The interim territory is addressed in the Court’s key decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,20 in which only
those forms of regulation that leave the landowner with no
viable economic use of the property are thought to require
compensation by a modest extension of Loretto. The rest
remains in political solution.
To address these issues, I shall proceed as follows. In
Part I, I shall stress the critical distinction between those
issues that are relevant to the question of whether a taking has
taken place and those issues that relate to the level of
compensation owing once the taking is established. I argue that
the only way to attack these issues is to track the private-law
rules, as noted earlier, that govern the distinction between
liability and damages. I then argue that hard-edged rules are
needed for deciding liability in private law and for deciding the
taking question in public law. In Part II, I show how this
framework plays out with the dubious constitutional distinction
between permanent and temporary takings. In Part III, I apply
that same framework to the distinction between physical and
regulatory takings. In Part IV, I show how this analysis helps
discern the proper rule of transferable development rights in
takings law. A brief conclusion follows.
17

See, e.g., Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
18
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
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The current state of the law of takings requires a
thorough reexamination of the relationship between occupation,
regulation, and compensation, which today give the state far too
much running room in dealing with the wide range of
condemnation and regulation cases in the land use area. This
problem is likely to prove especially acute in major cities like
New York. The root of the difficulty lies not in the particulars
but in matters of basic structure. To see why this is the case, it is
best to step back from the particular institutional arrangements
and ask about how best to design any system of regulation.
In this regard, it is often a mistake to start with public
systems, because it is all too easy to become entranced with the
proposition that the state should be endowed with special
rights that transcend those of its particular citizens. After all,
if all property comes top down from the state, it is easy, even
after the fact, to announce that a particular grant was subject
to conditions—express or implied—that constrain its proper
use. It is also too easy to fall into the comfortable complacency
of Justice John Paul Stevens in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, when he wrote:
Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held
under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be
injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that requires compensation
whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.21

From this mistaken premise, it takes little imagination
for local opposition to real estate development to conjure up
harm that is “injurious to the community” so that the takings
law is dramatically severed from the law of nuisance. The
adoption of this broad definition of harm thus makes it
inevitable that some harm will occur no matter what is done, so
that it always lies within the political domain to decide which
harms should be controlled and which disallowed. This
inclusive account of the harm principle in turn creates a broad
and capacious view of the police power that necessarily shunts
off to one side any claims for private property rights. As that
21

omitted).

480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
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deus ex machina is not available in private disputes, all
entitlements claims are more subject to scrutiny. A better
approach is surely needed, and that, in turn, depends on the
effective utilization of bright-line rules that already organize so
many voluntary arrangements.
B.

Bright-Line Rules

In the private law, the major objective is to minimize
the level of frictions between neighbors in order to allow
productive activities to go forward with minimum fuss and
bother. Clear boundary lines give individuals unique authority
to decide how to use given resources. This reduces the level of
transactional confusion and uncertainty that comes when
government officials are given a huge reservoir of power to
insist that certain activities are in violation of some implied,
but utterly unspecified, account of the police power.
The current jumble of takings law fails to articulate the
bright-line rules that are needed to decide whether
compensation is owing and if so, what level is required. In
organizing the law of takings, it is critical to remember that
every legal system must make a choice between two types of
rules.22 One option is a bright-line rule that is reminiscent of a
foul line in baseball or a boundary line in football. Decisions
are made by looking at outputs, not inputs. Balls that are hit
foul are not in play. Those that are hit fair are within play. The
entire system is dichotomous, so much so that detailed
determinations must be made as to whether the entire foot or
ball has to be in bounds, or whether it is sufficient that there is
some overlap, however small, between the foot or ball and the
line. These systems are pervasive in every sport. To be sure,
there are modest tweaks to make the system work better: the
player who is pushed out of bounds can be treated as if he
landed in bounds, and so on. And there is usually a second tier
of sanctions for bean balls and flagrant fouls that can impose
something akin to criminal sanctions: fines, suspensions,
rehab, and the like. But never let the exceptions divert
attention from the main feature of the system, which involves

22

I pursue this theme in Richard A. Epstein, The Irrelevance of the Hand
Formula: How Institutional Arrangements Structure Tort Liability, in LIBER
AMICORUM BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT 65-76 (Jef De Mot ed., Brugge, Die Keure 2012)
(Festschrift in honor of Boudewijn Bouckaert).

2013]

PROTECTION OF PARTIAL INTERESTS IN LAND

599

bright-line rules with clear outcomes that are measurable
independent of the efforts of the participants.
The same utilization of bright-line rules should be
dominant in organizing systems of legal liability. Under a
negligence system, these disputes are all too often decided by a
detailed examination of the defendant’s conduct leading up to
the occurrence of harm. That long inquiry need not be
undertaken under a thoroughgoing system of strict liability.
Boundary rules, such as those involved in any sound code of
traffic rules, should determine in principle how the system
applies. If neither party deviates from the rules, no accident
occurs. If one party deviates, and the other does not, that party
bears the full liability. If both deviate, they share the
responsibility. This system, which is commonly used in
practice, has much more clarity than the standard formulas of
negligence that invite a generalized balancing regime
commonly associated with the Hand formula.23 Under this
approach, many formal tests of liability unwisely stress that a
party may be found liable for negligence only if care levels fall
below some socially determined figure. In practice, the rules of
negligence per se, tied closely to compliance with the traffic
rules, often negate those kinds of inquiries.
On matters of public administration, the key point here
concerns theory, not practice. And in practice, where huge
numbers of claims must be processed with great rapidity, the
detailed inquiry into negligence never takes place at all,
because it is just too expensive.24 Quite simply, a liability rule is
an on–off switch. A bright-line rule is also an on–off switch. The
two match well with each other. A clear set of factual
determinants eases the burden on decision makers ex post. Care
levels are not directly monitored, but the output-based rules
exert powerful incentives on private parties to conform their
conduct to law. Indeed, as a first approximation, the defendant
who knows he will face liability will organize conduct so that he
takes all cost-effective precautions, just as the Hand formula
requires.25 The result is appropriate levels of care, without
having to incur the cost of monitoring. No one doubts that in
some cases, matters of solvency and the like could dictate some
23

The Hand formula compares the expected costs of accidents against the burden
of precaution. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
24
See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 98-99 (2d ed. 1980).
25
See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
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form of ex ante relief by way of injunction. But even so,
whenever a liability system is needed, the output measures will
work best so long as we can set the rules of the road.
Once liability is determined, the question of
compensation for losses remains. There are endless variations
on how proper compensation should be computed, but for these
purposes, there is only one point that matters. Any sensible
rule on compensation requires that the trier of fact use a
continuous distribution on the valuation so that the
compensation provided can be proportionate to the loss
inflicted. That distribution is required whether we think in
terms of fairness or efficiency—or some combination of the two.
And this proposition remains true even if it is universally
agreed that certain types of losses can only be translated into
dollars and cents with great difficulty, if at all. The point here
is that the only two choices we have are fixed damage amounts
or variable compensation. Owing to the pervasive and
inevitable variation in the extent of these wrongs, the variable
measure dominates every time. It does so, moreover, regardless
of the rule that is used to determine liability in the first place.
In essence, the correct sequence is liability by rule, damages by
degree. Simple to state, if hard to carry out.
The same set of insights carries over to decisions by
government to condemn land or regulate land use. The
boundary lines that play such a key role in dealing with
sporting events and automobile accidents should have the same
role in land use cases. The decision on whether compensation is
owing is an on–off question, which in the first instance should
be subject to a bright-line rule. The question of damages
awarded for the property taken should vary, as a first
approximation, with the value of the property taken. Even if
other elements such as consequential damages are added back
into the mix, they too should be determined continuously.
Unfortunately, the current set of constitutional norms
only follows the second half of this dual strategy, as set out
under the Loretto test. The cases of permanent physical
occupation are said to require compensation on a per se rule,
leaving the amount owing to the extent of the loss. But under the
Penn Central rule, all other partial takings of land are treated as
mere regulatory takings, which are manifestly subject to rather
different rules. The uncertainty here comes on two dimensions,
both of which require some discussion. The first is the line
between a permanent and a temporary taking. The second is the
line between occupation and regulation. Both distinctions quickly
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become terms of art, and both require some comment before
turning to specific land use systems of regulation.
II.

PERMANENT VERSUS TEMPORARY TAKINGS

The line between permanent and temporary takings has
its origins in Justice Holmes’s eloquent but misguided decision
in Block v. Hirsh, which sustained a “temporary” two-year
ordinance designed to keep rents under control in the
aftermath of World War I.26 Holmes stated the case succinctly:
[T]he [statutory] provisions . . . are made necessary by emergencies
growing out of the war, resulting in rental conditions in the District
dangerous to the public health and burdensome to public officers,
employees and accessories, and thereby embarrassing the Federal
Government in the transaction of the public business. As emergency
legislation the Title is to end in two years unless sooner repealed.27

In dealing with the challenge, Justice Holmes did not
make any reference to the distinction between physical and
regulatory takings, which then lay far in the future. Nor did he
deny that the holdover tenant had taken the property from the
landlord.28 Instead, he made two arguments. The first was an
implicit police power justification, namely, that the chaotic
conditions after the war required this regulatory intervention.29
Justice Holmes never asked the question whether it would
have been better to offer housing allowances to government
employees instead of entrenching all tenants in their property
for two years, regardless of their personal situations.
Somewhat unconvinced by his own rationale, he then added
this Holmesian flourish: “The regulation is put and justified
only as a temporary measure. A limit in time, to tide over a
passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld
as a permanent change.”30
No explanation, and no sense. The question in this case
was whether a decision to order a holdover tenant into the
premises has to be regarded as a taking for a term. The entire
law of property understands how critical it is to specify
ownership rights in land not only by metes and bounds but also
by time. The use of that second dimension makes possible
26
27
28
29
30

Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 154-56.
Id. at 157 (citation omitted).
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extensive gains from trade through the division of property
interests. The clear temporal division makes it clear who is
entitled to possession of the premises at any given time. More
complex arrangements, such as shared premises and leases,
can be negotiated by contract. The correct public-law approach
is to track the private-law distinctions.
The categorical distinction between permanent and
temporary takings so prized by Holmes suffers from two fatal
defects. The first is that it is not possible to identify which
cases fall on which side the line. Property is always projected
on the plane of time, so that interests can run from a shortterm lease to the fee simple absolute, which has no definite
termination date. All of these are property interests, defined by
time as well as space. Under the private law, all are protected
equally. When the system of state regulation seeks to upset that
continuous understanding, it faces the very set of problems that
the private law has been able to overcome. On questions of
degree, the fundamental inquiry is this: why should some
(undefined) class require full compensation for a loss, while
another class, which lies a hair’s breath away on the other side
of the line, requires none. No one can explain why that
permanent–temporary line should be drawn at a day, year,
decade, or century. Yet, under Holmes’s formulation,
compensation, as measured by the difference between contract
and market, must be furnished by the state in permanent but
not temporary cases. Surely, permanent cannot cover only cases
that last forever, but has to cover occupation for 100 years, or
even for periods that equal or exceed the useful life of the
structure. So, already, permanent means “not quite permanent.”
The second flaw is that this supposed distinction lacks
the hard-edged character needed for on–off determinations. In
reality, that hard-edged line is supplied the moment the tenant
overstays the lease. At that point, the longer the tenant stays
in possession, the greater the compensation owing. Nowhere
does Holmes offer any coherent rationale based on notions of
fairness or efficiency to explain why a clear line should be
abandoned in favor of a distinction that turns cases into matters
of degree. The difference by length is, however, perfectly covered
by continuous modification of the compensation levels to reflect
precisely the duration of deprivation. It may well be that some
consequential damages should be given to the landlord as well,
but those too should depend on the nature of the dislocation,
without any distinction between permanent and temporary. The
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distinction violates the fundamental structural requirements of
a good system of compensation for physical takings.
The differences in approach matter. One simple
illustration is the current system of rent stabilization in New
York City, which in its current form has been in place now
continuously since 1969.31 But that notational three-year term
is a victory of appearance over reality. The defenders of rent
control were well familiar with Holmes’s decision, so that they
have studiously avoided any permanent rent control that could
run afoul of his dictum. Instead, from the outset, the current
practice in New York City has called for a succession of threeyear temporary programs—each tied in ritual fashion to the
Holmesian emergency.32 The system requires the City Council
and the Mayor to certify in a pro forma fashion that the
shortage, defined as a vacancy rate below 5 percent, still
continues.33 “In order to extend the Rent Stabilization Law, the
City must determine that a housing emergency exists to merit
the need for rent stabilization,” said Mayor Bloomberg.34 The
vacancy rate is now 3.12 percent.35 Done. It matters not that
the low-cost rentals (plus countless other restrictions) are the
cause of the shortage.
The object lesson of the ritual reenactment is to show
that it is easy beyond words to game the short-versus-long
timeline that Holmes proposed in Block v. Hirsh. In contrast, it
is not possible to game any system in which the duration of the
taking moves in lockstep with the amount of the compensation
owing. Yet none of these considerations work themselves into a
system known for the below-market rates it gives to some
tenants, thereby forcing others in nonstabilized units to bear
the full brunt of new arrivals to the New York rental market.
The wrong constitutional frame has generated the wrong
political response, with the wrong social outcomes. The key
31

N.Y.C. Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 26501 to -520 (1969), available at http://tenant.net/Rent_Laws/RSL/rsltoc.html (last
visited Dec. 26, 2012).
32
See N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines Bd., Rent Act of 2011, HOUSINGNYC,
http://www.housingnyc.com/html/resources/rent2011.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2012).
33
Bloomberg Extends Rent Control for Three More Years, REAL DEAL (Mar.
27, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://therealdeal.com/blog/2012/03/27/bloomberg-extends-rentcontrol-for-three-more-years/.
34
Kim Velsey, Rental Relief! Mayor Bloomberg Renews NYC Rent Regulation
Law, N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://observer.com/2012/03/rentalrelief-mayor-bloomberg-renews-nyc-rent-regulation-law/.
35
Press Release, NYC.gov, Mayor Bloomberg Releases Findings of 2011 New
York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (Feb. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2012a/pr050-12.html.
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point in all these cases is that, as a matter of first principle, the
duration of the regulation only determines the amount of
compensation for the government regulation, but not the fact of
a taking itself. The use of the correct definition eliminates New
York City’s ability to evade the just compensation requirement
through its system of successive regulations that are the
functional equivalent of a system of long-term regulation.
The shaky line between continuous and permanent
occupation also arises in flooding cases. On this score, the
received wisdom deviates from sound principles by insisting on
a strong line between a tort and a taking. The distinction has
been articulated in unmistakable terms in the Supreme Court
case law. In Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States,36 a
unanimous Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes,
held that damage to plaintiff’s bridge by the government’s
blasting operations counted as a noncompensable tort and not
as taking of the private property. Then, in Sanguinetti v.
United States, Justice Sutherland wrote: “[I]n order to create
an enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least,
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the
structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the
land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an
injury to the property.”37 Justice Frankfurter pursued the same
theme in United States v. Dickinson, when he wrote: “Property
is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made
upon an owner’s use of it to an extent that, as between private
parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or
in course of time.”38 These pronouncements are misguided for
two separate reasons.39
First, they make the level of compensation turn on the
length of the causal chain. Harms that are “direct” are covered,
while those which are indirect are not. That distinction is at
variance with the normal private-law treatment of the same
subject, where the only question for liability is not whether the
harm was directly or indirectly caused, but whether the harm
in question was too remote to be attributable to the defendant’s
act. Under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, which cemented the
role of strict liability in nineteenth-century England, it is
immaterial whether the defendants poured or sent water down
36
37
38
39

260 U.S. 125, 127 (1922).
Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924).
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
For my earlier critique, see EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 44-46.
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the mine of the plaintiff,40 or whether it came to rest in the
reservoir before it broke through its foundation. Under the
famous formulation of Judge Blackburn, it was enough that
“the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his own peril . . . .”41 Similarly, in
Spano v. Perini Corp., yet another blasting case, the Court held
that it was immaterial whether “there was ‘a physical invasion’
of, or trespass on, the plaintiff’s property . . . [or whether] the
damage was caused by ‘setting the air in motion, or in some
other unexplained way.’”42 The question is whether the
defendant could be said to have caused the harm. The length of
the causal chain did not influence any finding of liability, even
though in earlier times it may have influenced the choice of
remedy between trespass and trespass on the case.43 The
question thus remains why a distinction that is regarded as
immaterial to liability under the tort law should assume
decisive importance when the question turns to compensation
under the Takings Clause.
Second, as a matter of tort theory, it is utterly
immaterial to the plaintiff’s case for compensation that the
defendant did not acquire some sort of servitude over his
property. The question under tort is always what level of harm
was caused, not what return benefit the plaintiff received. To be
sure, in some cases, where a trespass caused trivial harm to the
plaintiff but supplied great benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff
could elect to waive the tort remedy and sue instead for
restitution.44 That restitution is clearly blocked by the Takings
Clause, whose major function is to make sure that the landowner
cannot hold out against a government project. The compromise
solution is that the government program can go forward but only
if the landowner receives compensation for his losses.

40

Fletcher v. Rylands, [1865] 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (L.R. Exch.). Per Bramwell, B.,
“The defendants had no right to pour or send water onto the plaintiff’s works.” Id. at 743.
41
Fletcher, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279, aff’d sub nom, [1868] Rylands v.
Fletcher 3 L.R.E. & I. App. (H.L) 330.
42
Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 34 (N.Y. 1969) (quoting Booth v.
Rome, 35 N.E. 592, 596 (N.Y. 1893)).
43
For discussion of the importance of the forms of action, see OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77-84 (1881).
44
See Phillips v. Homfray, [1883] 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883). For discussion, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1400
n.73 (1994).
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The rickety structure of the current law is illustrated by
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States45—another
flooding case that has just been decided by the Supreme
Court.46 At issue in that case was whether the United States
owed compensation for the sporadic release of water from
behind a dam that the Army Corps of Engineers constructed in
southeast Missouri. The deliberate release of water from
behind the dam flooded 23,000 acres of timberland that the
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission owned some 115 miles
south of the dam. Between 1993 and 2000, water from behind
the dam was, from time to time, released in order to control the
rate of flow from the Black River. It was agreed on all hands
that a permanent occupation of the lands by flood water would
be a compensable event. Not so, for temporary releases. The
question then was how to treat these periodic and unscheduled
releases, which, without question, destroyed trees owned by the
Arkansas Commission when the water from the flood
undermined the root systems of the trees before it receded. It
was clear that the Corps’ operation of the dam necessarily had
to cause some releases, but there was a disagreement as to the
foreseeability of the type and extent of damages.
The case received an exhaustive treatment in the
Federal Circuit, where Judge Dyk reviewed the relevant
precedents, which he summarized as follows:
As with structural cases, in determining whether a governmental
decision to release water from a dam can result in a taking, we must
distinguish between action which is by its nature temporary and that
which is permanent. But in distinguishing between temporary and
permanent action, we do not focus on a structure and its consequence.
Rather we must focus on whether the government flood control policy
was a permanent or temporary policy. Releases that are ad hoc or
temporary cannot, by their very nature, be inevitably recurring.47

Stated otherwise, we are told that the relevant line is
that a government action “must ‘constitute an actual,
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation
of and not merely an injury to the property.’”48 The dissent of
45

Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
46
See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 511.
47
637 F.3d at 1377. The relevant precedents, accurately summarized, include
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 328 (1987), Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924), and
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
48
Sanguinetti, 246 U.S. at 149.
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Judge Newman did not disagree on the overall approach, but
drew the line between a permanent and temporary taking in a
different place. Precedent, according to Judge Newman, well
establishes that when property “is actually invaded by
superinduced additions of water . . . so as to effectively destroy
or impair its usefulness, it is a taking[] within the meaning of
the Constitution . . . .”49 “Precedent does not require constant or
permanent flooding, and eventual abatement of the flooding
does not defeat entitlement to just compensation; the specific
facts must be considered, as for any invasion of property.”50
Neither of these ad hoc views held when the case
reached the Supreme Court. The Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission had a victory of sorts in the U.S. Supreme Court,
which unanimously ordered the case remanded for further
consideration. Ironically, the issue of sovereign immunity, which
loomed so large in the decisions below was nowhere addressed
by the Court, where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg framed the
question to ask “whether a taking may occur, within the
meaning of the Takings Clause, when government-induced flood
invasions, although repetitive, are temporary.”51 Yet once again
the question illustrates the ragged nature of the permanent–
temporary distinction, and necessarily raises the question of how
repetitive and severe these flood invasions must be to cross over
the line between noncompensable and compensable events. No
matter where that line is drawn, the risk remains that the
differences in outcome will depend not only on the total amount
of flood damage that takes place, but on small differences in
the frequency and intensity of the individual events that
compose the whole. Yet at no point did the fine points of the
distribution of floods alter the bottom line that before the floods
began the forest lands were “healthy and flourishing,” while
afterwards they were not.52
At this point, the opinion becomes murky at best.
Justice Ginsburg begins by quoting the most familiar line from
Armstrong v. United States, to the effect that “The Takings
Clause is ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”53 In that case
49
50
51
52
53

Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872).
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1381.
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 515.
Id. at 517.
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960): The full passage reads:
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the Supreme Court held that a materialman’s lien on a naval
vessel could not be dissolved by the unilateral action of the
United States unless it paid just compensation.
But in the next breadth she notes that notwithstanding
this general proposition, “most takings claims turn on
situation-specific factual inquiries.”54 At this point, the question
of compensability becomes hopelessly ad hoc, as all the subtle
differences in degree that should be relevant to the question of
compensation owed are now thrown into the hopper to
determine whether any compensation is owed at all. The
Supreme Court again plunges into conceptual darkness by
failing to understand that bright-line rules are needed to
determine whether any compensation is owing. Only then are
continuous rules needed to determine the amount of
compensation required. So after an inconclusive examination of
its past decisions, the Court refuses to accept the government’s
slippery slope argument to relieve it of all liability regardless of
the severity of the flooding in question. So it is back to the
laundry list of factors, at which point a remand is now
required:
When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government
interferes with private property, our decisions recognize, time is
indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a
compensable taking. . . .
Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the
invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized
government action. . . . So, too, are the character of the land at issue
and the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations”
regarding the land’s use. . . . Severity of the interference figures in
the calculus as well.55

Treated, therefore, as a matter of private law, the
precedents cited earlier demonstrate that compensation applies
in both permanent and temporary takings, so that on the
question of liability, the variations in question are of no
consequence. Ex post, it is possible to both identify the harms

The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for
a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this
constitutional protection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here.
54

Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518 (citing Penn Central Transp.
Co., v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), discussed infra at Part IV).
55
Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
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caused by the flooding and the measure of damages involved.
Armed with that information, there is no need to ask about the
frequency and distribution of the harms in question to decide
whether compensation is owing. All physical harms are
compensable. The battle is solely over amount.
Once this unified approach is taken, it is no longer
necessary to distinguish between cases where the government
is protected from mere tort claims and those where it must pay
full compensation for the permanent occupation of land. It is
therefore no longer necessary to ask when government action
crosses some indefinite line that morphs a noncompensable tort
into a full-blooded, compensable taking. Both cases involve
physical invasions. Everything else on timing and detail is only
relevant to the valuation question. In addition, the added
intellectual clarity from a clean rule helps organize judicial
behavior and send the correct incentives to administrative
bodies. Returning to the flooding precedents, the conceptual
problem is this: it is always possible to imagine distinct release
schedules that over any defined period of time cause exactly
the same amount of downstream damage as a single release.
Do we want to say that a few large releases should be subject to
a compensation requirement when the periodic smaller
releases that cause identical harm are not? What do we do with
releases in three equal installments? This is no different from
saying that the government must compensate the individual
from whom it seizes $1000 in a lump sum, but need not pay
any compensation when it takes an irregular set of future
payments whose present value equals $1000.
The issue here is not whether we can guess about which
cases to put on which side of the line, but why it is that we
need to draw the line at all. This is not a case where there is
some “average reciprocity of advantage” to both sides, which
tucks nicely into Holmes’s famous aphorism.56 Unfortunately, in
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the downstream releases
all go necessarily in one direction, which means that the
United States always wins and Arkansas always loses.57 There
56

For the initial use of the phrase, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922), speaking of what “secured an average reciprocity of advantage
that has been recognized as a justification of various laws.” For extensive discussion of
the case, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 13-61 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic
Takings Jurisprudence of Justice Holmes, 86 GEO. L.J. 875 (1998).
57
For discussion of this asymmetry, see Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights,
State of Nature Theory, and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. L. & LIBERTY 1 (2008).

610

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

is no question that these releases would be actionable at
common law,58 and there is no reason why any court should
attempt to divide them into different classes to resolve a
dispute that need not arise. The bifurcation of the analysis into
takings and damages eliminates, in the ex post world, a set of
arbitrary distinctions that no jurisprudence can make clear.
Eliminating this distinction puts on the government the full
costs of its actions, so that it no longer has any incentive to
game the system by using a set of temporary releases that
artfully stay on the noncompensation side of the line. It is only
a small irony that the coercion for environmental protection
that drives government programs into overdrive against
private defendants, often at the cost of serious due process
violations,59 is blithely ignored by unprincipled efforts to
artificially narrow the class of compensable events. This double
standard makes hash out of the law of partial takings.
There is no coherent reason to have the on–off switch of
compensation turn on the frequency, severity, and distribution
of the harm. These are questions of degree that should, under
no circumstances, be raised to ostensible differences in kind.
The purpose of strict liability in tort is to control the
externalities created when activity on one land causes harm on
another. Armed with the information in the ex post state of the
world, there is no reason to figure out the knowledge possessed
by government agents at the outset when they devised their
flood control plan. Instead, government officials are held
responsible for what they do, like other actors. Rather than
face up to the implications of the broad scope of the
constitutional protection that is offered under the Takings
Clause, the Justices of the Supreme Court to date have
preferred to announce and defend untenable distinctions with
perfect confidence. The result is predictable chaos. But here as
elsewhere, there is no way to get the right result by tweaking
the wrong premises.
III.

TAKINGS VERSUS REGULATION

The permanent–temporary line is a dead loser in
takings law. So too is the ostensibly related constitutional
distinction between takings and regulation. The origin of this
distinction lies in Holmes’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
58
59

See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-73 (2012).
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Mahon,60 which is an infuriating mix between great intellectual
insight and unpardonable legal gibberish. The case involved
the question of whether the local government could condemn
out a support easement that Pennsylvania Coal had explicitly
reserved for itself when it conveyed the surface interest to
Mahon (and to others similarly situated) in 1878. The retention
of the support easement meant, in effect, that the coal company
had the right to dig out coal from under the surface without
worrying whether the land or any buildings on it would cave in.
The legislative decision at issue essentially transferred the
easement in question back to the owner. The clear
conveyancing rule that governs this particular case is that once
the two parties have agreed to one division of common
property, any decision by the state to alter that division of
rights constitutes a taking of an interest vested in one and
transferring it to the other. The key point here is that to
answer the takings question there is no need to ask whether
the state transfer of the support easement was a total transfer
of a partial interest or a partial transfer of a larger interest.
Either way it is a taking. All the fine points go only to
valuation on the extent of the loss to the coal company, not to
the government’s liability.
Justice Holmes got this case half right. His most apt
comparison is found in this proposition:
If in any case its representatives have been so short sighted as to
acquire only surface rights without the right of support, we see no
more authority for supplying the latter without compensation than
there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing
to pay for it because the public wanted it very much.61

But in other places he strays off the mark by misstating
how the police power interacts with the Takings Clause.
Mahon is not like the ordinary situation where the government
enjoins a private nuisance, at which point it owes no more
compensation to the landowner than would be required of
private plaintiffs who succeeded on the same theory. But in
this setting the protection of safety for the surface owner
involves the destruction of private interest previously
conveyed. Compensation is thus owed here just as it would be
owed if the state took timber from the land of a third party to
shore up the mining operations of Pennsylvania Coal.
60
61

260 U.S. at 412-16.
Id. at 415.
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Justice Holmes, however, had long had a strong
tendency to argue that matters of degree often should be
treated as though they create differences in kind—in violation
of our fundamental structural constraint. Thus, in Leroy Fibre
Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway62 the question
was whether there was contributory negligence in a plaintiff
that stored its flax too close to the railroad tracks. The majority
decision of Justice McKenna treated this as a question of
property rights and held the distance irrelevant. There was no
duty to remove the flax from the tracks. Holmes, however,
thought that the owners should have done so, tested by the
question of “whether the plaintiff’s flax was so near to the track
as to be in danger from even a prudently managed engine.”63
Thereafter, Holmes waxes eloquent:
I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my
view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as
soon as it is civilized. Negligence is all degree[]—that of the
defendant here degree of the nicest sort; and between the variations
according to distance that I suppose to exist and the simple
universality of the rules in the Twelve Tables or the Leges
Barbarorum, there lies the culture of two thousand years.64

In modern terms, Holmes may well have been right to
think that in these cases some “joint care” solution might make
sense. It could well be that some fire suppression steps by the
railroad should be coupled with some loss protection by the
landowner. But if so, the nature of that dual accommodation
remains unclear. Distance is a very weak proxy, and a more
elaborate set of accommodations by legislation might prove
sensible.
Just that statutory solution was adopted in the simpler
situation involving the tension between rights of privacy and
the construction of spite fences in Holmes’s 1889 decision in
Rideout v. Knox.65 There, Holmes resorted to a similar
distinction of degree to uphold against challenge a statute that
allowed for a finding of a spite fence, but only for fences over
six feet high.66 He noted, first, that at common law, normally
owners can build their fences as high as they choose, so that

62
63
64
65
66

LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 340-41 (1914).
Id. at 353 (Holmes, J., partially concurring).
Id. at 354 (internal citations omitted).
Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 391 (Mass. 1889).
Id. at 392.
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the laws here impose a clear limitation on that established
property right. He then continued:
But it does not follow that the rule is the same for a boundary fence,
unnecessarily built more than six feet high. It may be said that the
difference is only one of degree. Most differences are, when nicely
analyzed. At any rate, difference of degree is one of the distinctions
by which the right of the legislature to exercise the police power is
determined. Some small limitations of previously existing rights
incident to property may be imposed for the sake of preventing a
manifest evil; larger ones could not be, except by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain.67

The reason this solution works for this case is not
because of the fuzzy way in which Holmes tries to articulate
the distinction between the police power and the eminent
domain power. Rather, it is because the statute preserves a
safe harbor for fences up to eye-level, where the risk to privacy
from nearby pedestrians is greatest. The extra requirement of
malice works well here because the average reciprocity of
advantage does suggest that both sides are better off from this
restriction of the normal right to increase the height of fences.
The issue, therefore, is not just a simple question of degree, as
Holmes thinks. Viewed as a whole, the statute could easily
work a Pareto improvement between neighbors: this wellconstructed legal regime makes it highly likely that the
average reciprocity of advantage satisfies the just
compensation requirement. Yet that reciprocity condition is
manifestly violated in Pennsylvania Coal, where Holmes sticks
with his (now misplaced) distinction of degree. He jumps
headlong into the fire when he writes the one sentence that,
above all others, has set modern takings law off on the wrong
track: “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking.”68 At
this point, the trap door springs shut, as the line between
67

Id.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Holmes then talks about
the public necessity cases without analyzing them. In fact, they require some kind of a
split verdict. In those cases where the property of A, which would not be harmed by the
fire, is used to prevent its spread, compensation should be owing. But in those cases
where the state destroys property that would otherwise be destroyed by the
conflagration, then no compensation is required, except for the trivial loss of the use
value for the time between the earlier destruction and its final destruction, which can
be ignored. See Mayor of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend. 126, 129-30 (N.Y. 1837). For
further discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES &
MATERIALS ON TORTS 51-52 (10th ed. 2012). Once again Holmes’s uncertain grasp of
private law leads to an unnecessary level of indecision in dealing with the
constitutional issues.
68
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takings and valuation disappears. The question of
compensability now morphs into one of degree, and in
Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes argues that the regulation has
crossed the line because, “[t]o make it commercially
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying it.”69
Once again, the equivocation, “very nearly the same
effect,” gives rise to the question of whether it does or it
doesn’t. The correct answer in this case does not turn on the
futile distinction between physical and regulatory takings.
Correctly understood, the loss of the support easement ends the
takings inquiry, and the proper measure of damage depends on
the effects of the regulation on the operation of the mine. It
makes no difference on this ground whether the taking in
question is “physical”—insofar as it is not possible to take out
columns of coal needed to support the surface—or “regulatory”
because the coal can be removed so long as the mining company
complies with requirements to put in place substitute measures
to support the surface. Holmes’s intellectual shipwreck repeats
an oft-made error in takings law by having questions of degree
masquerade as distinctions in kind.
IV.

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AS “JUST
COMPENSATION”

This self-conscious muddle between the takings issue
and the compensation issue is well-illustrated by taking a look
at one of the “post-zoning devices” discussed at this
conference—transferable development rights (TDRs). The idea
behind TDRs is to use the development rights that are granted
in one location (“the receiving site”) as compensation for the
development rights that are lost in another (“the sending
site”).70 The reason for making that shift is to preserve a sense
of open spaces in some sensitive areas, while directing
development to those areas where it will cause, on balance, the
fewest environmental dislocations. TDRs are discussed at
length in my colleague Professor Vicki Been’s instructive paper
on modern efforts to increase their utilization by matching new
69

Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414-15.
See
NOELLE
HIGGINS,
WHAT
ARE
TDRS?,
available
at
http://depts.washington.edu/open2100/pdf/3_OpenSpaceImplement/Implementation_
Mechanisms/transfer_development_rights.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
70
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projects with empty spaces.71 Her inquiry asks how best to
fashion market devices to secure the transfer of these rights
between parties. She notes, correctly, that two obstacles stand
in the path of their rapid transfer. The first of these is
unavoidable. These rights are hard to value, so that the costs
involved in their transfer are high relative to the potential
gains, even in a voluntary market, including the heavy cost of
securing support rights from the surface owner in
Pennsylvania Coal. Second, matters are made more complex by
the wide range of government restrictions that limit the sale of
TDRs, which include the need for the transferee of the TDR to
secure a distinct zoning clearance for new construction, a long
and tortuous process. As Professor Been notes, it is hard to
make this a robust market.
The antecedent question is why in a system with strong
property rights there ever arises the need to transfer the TDRs
in the first place, given that the owner of the “receiving site”
would already hold the rights to development on his own land.
In this regard, it is important to see how the Penn Central case
uses TDRs to grease the way to an intolerable account of the
regulatory takings test, which is its enduring legacy. Recall
that in Penn Central, the question that faced the Supreme
Court was whether the designation of Grand Central Terminal
as a landmark site meant that the city could stop the
construction of the Breuer Tower without compensation, so
long as the surface owner could cover its costs, and then some,
by the revenue obtained from its use of the existing structures
on the land. Even though Grand Central station was not a
public utility, the issue of rates came up in the New York Court
of Appeals because it was unclear whether Penn Central could
keep its operations at Grand Central Station out of the red if it
were forced to abandon the use of its air rights. Thus, if the
building had been valued at market, the revenues were
insufficient to allow Penn Central to make a decent rate of
return.72 But if the size of the protected interest could be
lowered, then the suitable return could be found off that
smaller base.
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Vicki Been & John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs:
“Post-Zoning”?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 435 (2013).
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Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274-75
(N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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In the New York Court of Appeals,73 the entire case was
treated as a rate regulation matter.74 Judge Charles Breitel
advanced the novel theory that the rates in question did not
have to compensate the property owner for those additional
values added solely by virtue of the benefits that the property
owner received from its large locational advantages. He wrote
that “a property owner is not absolutely entitled to receive a
return on so much of the property value as was created by
social investment.”75 He never bothered to note that the
property owner contributed to that social investment by the
payment of real estate taxes and by the positive contribution
that its private investment in real estate improvements made
to the overall neighborhood. Breitel’s logic plainly has bizarre
implications, for if the city need not compensate for
neighborhood advantages in a regulation setting, it need not
compensate for them in an outright condemnation case, so that
all landowners can recover at most a fraction of their value out
of the property on condemnation. That suspect valuation
standard leads, of course, to massive overcondemnation of
property, which could then be sold off for a nifty profit, again at
market rates. Any sensible approach recognizes that the
particular landowner both receives and contributes to local
values so that market valuation, at the very least, is necessary
to prevent overcondemnation of properties.
This goofy approach to rate regulation disappeared from
view in the U.S. Supreme Court. What took place, however,
was arguably worse. When the case was in the Supreme Court,
Penn Central argued that the case had to do with the
confiscation of a discrete property interest—namely, that in its
air rights over Grand Central Station—for which it received
nothing in return. In principle, a coherent theory of property
rights should yield the same result regardless of which
approach is taken. But in our politically charged world, Justice
Brennan was keen to make sure that landmark preservation
laws, which he noted were the norm throughout the United
States, should not be struck down by judicial intervention.76 All
73

See generally id.
For a contemporary discussion of the New York Court of Appeals decision,
see Richard Wollach, Penn Central v. City of New York: A Landmark Landmark Case,
6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 667, 679-83 (1977).
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Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1278.
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Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107 (“Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over
500 municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of
buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic importance.” The rest of the passage
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that remained was to determine how best to achieve that
result. In this particular situation, he made many views,
among the most egregious being that the improper equation of
loss of property rights through direct regulation could not be
attacked because it has “significantly diminished” the value of
the property site.77 In order to sustain that equivalence, he
made conscious reference to Justice Holmes’s decision in
Pennsylvania Coal—to the effect that “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law[]”78—and to an equally memorable quotation from
Justice Robert Jackson’s famous decision in United States v.
Willow River—to the effect that “this Court has dismissed
‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the challenged
government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere
with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’
for Fifth Amendment purposes.”79 In effect, the consequences of
government regulation are treated similarly to those of
diminution of property values attributable to competition,
when, in reality, the two are polar opposites. Competition
increases overall social wealth, while direct forms of regulation
often diminish it.
Nonetheless, Justice Brennan’s extensive dose of legal
realism is intended to set up the punch line, which contains the
very error that has infected takings law from the outset. It is,
alas, necessary to repeat his critical passage:
continues in laudatory fashion about the laws, with no reference to any of the possible
disadvantages of historical preservation.)
77
Id. at 131.
78
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
79
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25. The exact passage in Willow River reads:
It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value, and that the Company has
an economic interest in keeping the St. Croix at the lower level. But not all
economic interests are “property rights”; only those economic advantages are
“rights” which have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized
may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to
compensate for their invasion.
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). Justice Jackson
does not explain which expectations are rights, and which ones are not. More
concretely, he attaches no weight to the point that in a reasonable user regime, the
protection of these mill interests is routine in private-law disputes. For further
critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land
and Water, in DANIEL H. COLE & ELINOR OSTROM, PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER
RESOURCES 349-52 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1719254.
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The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole,” . . . this Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining
when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we
have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will
be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses
proximately caused by it depends largely “upon the particular
circumstances [in that] case.”
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s
decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A
“taking” may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government,
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.80

For these purposes, it is critical to note that Justice
Brennan makes the same (mistaken) use of Armstrong v.
United States that was made 34 years later by Justice
Ginsburg in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission. Instead of
applying the on–off switch for the air rights, he denied that the
needed clarity found in Armstrong was not achievable, so that
“ad hoc” rules with balancing tests had to be invoked to deal
with this situation. It is for that reason that the passage quoted
from Armstrong81 was chopped up and surrounded with
qualifiers insisting that it could not develop “a set formula”
that would eliminate the need to make “ad hoc, factual
inquires” under its well-known balancing test.82 And yet, little
is said as to why this should be the case.
The standard rule in these matters is that property
rights are creatures of state law, not federal law. Thus, in New
York, and virtually everywhere else, air rights are subject to
full protection under state law. It is a trespass to build in the
air space reserved to another. The owner has the right not only
80

Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (first and fourth alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
81
See supra notes 17 and 51 and accompanying text.
82
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24.
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to use the air rights, but to sell them, subdivide them, give
them away, and mortgage them. The overall efficiency of any
property system depends on the ability to decompose larger
interests into smaller ones, which will be done so long as the
cost of that division is less than the gains generated by it. The
correct response in all cases, therefore, is to insist that
whatever interests created are protected against takings, lest
the gains from that subdivision are threatened by government
action that confiscates the air rights in whole or in part.
Yet that was just what was done in Penn Central.
Justice Brennan begins by noting—falsely—that the law of
property looks at “the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax
block designated as the ‘landmark site.’”83 From that one
sentence it follows that so long as there is some residual value
to the parcel as a whole, the destruction of any fractional
interest is of no concern. As a result, these air rights are no
longer protected even after they are purchased by a third party,
which thereby injects a gratuitous uncertainty that
systematically disrupts private transactions.
At this point, Justice Brennan examined the role that
TDRs played over other properties played in the overall
analysis. No longer was it that they supply full and complete
compensation for the air rights lost. Instead they were reduced
to just one of the elements that went into the mix to decide
whether a compensable taking took place:
Although appellants and others have argued that New York City’s
transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the New
York courts here supportably found that, at least in the case of the
Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these rights may well
not have constituted “just compensation” if a “taking” had occurred, the
rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens
the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken
into account in considering the impact of regulation.84

One sign of intellectual sloppiness is to put quotation
marks around terms that prove inconvenient, so as to be sure
that they are not afforded their ordinary meaning. Justice
Brennan denatures both the just compensation and the takings
requirement by using just that tactic. In so doing, he abandons
any notion that you first decide whether property rights have
been taken and then ask whether compensation has been
supplied. Under that approach, the loss of the use of the air
83
84

Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 137.
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rights constitutes the taking. In Penn Central, however, New
York City offered no cash compensation, so that compensation
in-kind is supplied, if at all, through the TDRs. A correct
measure demands that “the compensation must be a full and
perfect equivalent for the property taken,”85 at which point the
question is whether getting some air rights that might be
exploited over some other property are equal in value to the air
rights that, because of the taking, cannot be exploited over
one’s own property. Justice Brennan does not even pretend
that there is any equivalence in value. Rather, in the parallel
universe of mere regulations, the sole purpose of the
regulations is to “mitigate” the loss from a “taking,” which
really hasn’t occurred anyhow.
He makes no effort to calculate the size of this
mitigation, which has to be small. There are no external
negotiations needed to build over a site that one already owns,
but there are extensive such negotiations that are required to
build on other sites, along with a host of other regulatory
requirements to be satisfied. The correct view constitutionally
on this issue is to never allow the government to compensate in
kind, except in those cases where the restrictions on one parcel
are part of the same comprehensive scheme that supplies
benefits to others. Thus, with a general set of height
restrictions, the correct approach is to ask whether the overall
value of the sites increases or not. If it does, no extra
compensation is required because the integrated plan supplies
the answer. Otherwise, cash is needed to make up the
difference. But in this case, there is no necessary connection
between the restrictions on the Penn Central site and the use
of the TDRs anywhere else. The correct procedure, and the only
one that leads to honest evaluations, requires New York to pay
in cash for the loss of the development rights—which it would
never do. It can then in a separate transaction auction off the
TDRs to get some accurate sense of their market value, which
is likely to be far less than the first sum.
By way of analogy, let us assume that the state wants to
condemn the development rights and pay for it with borrowed
sums of money. One possibility is to give the financial paper to
the condemnee. Its face value will of course equal that of the
lost development rights. But a note is a complex instrument,
and its interest coupons, maturity, collateral, and the like could
85
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easily influence its value. By forcing the state to sell off the
notes to third parties, the amount the state can receive is
limited to the fair market value of the paper, as evaluated by
an independent party. That number will reflect both the
interest rate and the riskiness of the note. Conversely, by
forcing the condemnee to take that paper for the value the
state assigns, it becomes impossible to gain evidence of its fair
market value, as the state will low-ball valuation every time.
The in-kind development rights discussed above permit that
same kind of evasion. The point becomes clear when one looks
at the rather paltry revenues that are generated from the sales
of TDRs, as reported by Professor Been.86 It is surely better that
these rights be sold in complex and cumbersome transfers than
left idle. But the central point is that the convoluted scheme for
regulatory takings has already sucked most of the value out of
the system by making the false parallel between the air rights
lost and those offered in exchange. The efficiency of this market
can only be restored by reversing Penn Central’s bundling
methodology, whose melding of the takings and compensation
issues necessarily obscures all questions of valuation. The use
of the correct procedure thus has this advantage. The taking of
the air rights creates a per se obligation to compensate. The
obligation to pay in cash, and not in TDRs, secures an honest
valuation of the property taken. If both the takings and
compensation elements are rightly done, the use of TDRs will
no longer allow the state to engage in overcondemnation by the
systematic practice of undercompensation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have sought to apply a unified theory of
takings law to explain why all partial interests in real estate
are entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as the
outright ownership of land. The development of that unified
approach eliminates the need to draw ad hoc lines to separate
cases that by any rational economic analysis should receive the
same treatment. The failure to grasp this one point thus leads
the courts to turn somersaults in the vain effort to explain why
compensation is awarded in some cases but denied in others.
Further massaging of the new battle lines, such as that
between permanent and temporary takings, will do nothing to
86
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fix the fundamental weaknesses of the situation. Only a fresh
conceptual start can save the current situation.
That fresh start is a tall order. The question that
necessarily arises is whether all the mistakes in doctrine really
matter. And they do. In essence, the various methods of dealing
with takings cases misprice all relevant assets. That is true in
the flooding and the rent control cases, where the untenable
line between temporary invasions or restrictions and
permanent takings systematically reduces the scope of
government regulation. It also happens in the general areas of
land use regulation with the highly dubious use of TDRs as a
means of compensation for property taken. In all these cases
the losses to the owners are systematically understated or
entirely ignored, which leads the government to take too much
and to pay too little for what it takes. Nor are any of these
government actions saved by pointing to some positive external
effects of the rules now in place. With the various zoning
ordinances, the obvious negative externalities—the broad class
of common law nuisances—are off the table. So the social gains
must arise, if at all, from various intangibles, dealing with such
issues as aesthetics and views. It is not the case that these issues
do not matter. But it is very difficult indeed to figure out which
way they do matter. The construction of the Breuer Tower over
Penn Central Station, for example, could have added another
masterpiece to the New York City landscape. That unit would
clearly have some positive externalities, along with possible
negative externalities. It is not as though the construction of any
building affects all persons in the neighborhood the same way. So
it is with views. Some views may be blocked, but others are now
created, and still others are enhanced.
The common law judgment on all these variations was
to ignore all these externalities because they point in no
particular direction. That position is defensible on these
grounds. First, the cost of intervention is very high, not only in
terms of direct regulation but also in lost business
opportunities. That is evident by looking at the extensive
laundry list on Brad Lander’s agenda. Second, the external
effects of these regulations are both positive and negative.
There is little reason to think that new construction is
systematically negative in its effects, and even less to think
that some large negative exceeds the other gains from the
construction in question. Other issues always remain, dealing
with traffic flow and the like, but in the case of landmark
preservation laws, these structures do not present any distinct
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issue. The upshot, therefore, is that landmark designation, like
other forms of innovative regulation, tends to contribute to
local stagnation, not to local prosperity. The just compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause, when not frittered away,
puts some brake on that process. Its own rationing system
helps bring the system back into alignment.
There are, of course, other devices for land planning
that remain even with a robust compensation requirement.
First, the local government can condemn the air rights if it
wishes to have them. It is virtually a moral certainty that no
one in New York City would have made the needed
appropriations from public funds to acquire—and retire—the
air rights over the Penn Central terminal. The same is surely
true with most other places in which regulations are put in place
by government fiat. Second, private organizations can enter the
market and buy up façades of structures that they wish to
preserve, or acquire land that they could then put in trust for
the desired purposes. None of these devices requires that
condemnation be undertaken at bargain rates, and all of them in
varying degrees may well operate to produce net social benefits.
There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from the
maintenance of the unhappy status quo. It involves these
propositions. First, politicians will prosper as they grant favors
to this group and that. Second, the successful interest groups
will support the operation of the system. Third, no court will
intervene to stop its operation. In the end, the very people who
laud the system will wonder how it is that if their grasp of land
use law and practice is so profound, the system can continue to
slide into reverse. The post-zoning alternatives are too often
proposed without taking into account the traditional pitfalls
that follow whenever these takings questions are regarded as
matters of degree rather than matters of kind. Unless the
system is altered to reflect this one sound governance
principle—the more the government takes by regulation or
occupation, the more it should pay—the likely result is that the
adoption of new techniques of land use regulation will follow
the downward path of the earlier land use initiatives.

